No Way to Treat Our Friends: Recasting Recent U.S.-Georgian Relations by Cooley, Alexander A. & Mitchell, Lincoln A.
This article was downloaded by: [Columbia University]
On: 14 September 2011, At: 13:15
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
The Washington Quarterly
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rwaq20
No Way to Treat Our Friends:
Recasting Recent U.S.––Georgian
Relations
Alexander Cooley & Lincoln A. Mitchell
Available online: 09 Jan 2009
To cite this article: Alexander Cooley & Lincoln A. Mitchell (2009): No Way to Treat Our Friends:
Recasting Recent U.S.––Georgian Relations, The Washington Quarterly, 32:1, 27-41
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01636600802540895
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-
conditions
This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any
representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The
accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified
with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims,
proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising
directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Alexander Cooley and Lincoln A. Mitchell
No Way to Treat Our
Friends: Recasting Recent
U.S./Georgian Relations
The tragic August conflict between Georgia and Russia has initiated a
wave of accusations about which side was to blame for the outbreak of full-scale
war. The war and its aftermath have ratcheted tensions between the West and
Russia, as the international community pressures Moscow to withdraw its troops
from Georgian territory and abide by its ceasefire obligations. Russia’s reckless
decision to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia not only
contravenes international law regarding sovereign statehood, but if allowed to
stand, would establish the unacceptable precedent that countries can justify
military intervention in the territory of a neighbor by invoking the rights of their
ethnic citizens. Not surprisingly, Moscow has found little support in the
international community for its heavy-handed actions, even among countries
friendly to Russia.
Yet, as analysts focus on the Russian-Georgian relationship, the questions of
how the United States*/Georgia’s friend and patron*/failed to anticipate the
conflict and prevent its escalation need to be addressed. Two unequivocal, but
ultimately flawed, principles guided recent U.S. policy towards Georgia. First,
the United States supported the Saakashvili government, rather than promoting
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broader Georgian democratic development. Sec-
ond, the United States backed reuniting Georgia’s
territorial integrity, rather than acting as an
honest broker to resolve the frozen conflicts
with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The strong
personalized ties that developed between Wa-
shington and Tbilisi prevented the United States
from using its power and influence to credibly
restrain the Saakashvili government from adopt-
ing a military solution. U.S. reluctance to en-
courage Georgia to consider alternative sovereign
formulas to resolve the frozen conflicts further
emboldened Georgian hardliners. Over time, the Georgian regime’s domestic
policies and priorities themselves became official U.S. policies and goals, leading
to an unhealthy capture of U.S. foreign policy by Tbilisi.
Looking forward, the United States must continue to offer robust and
sustained support to Georgia and its democratic development, but should do so
by reversing these demonstrably flawed principles. What policies should the new
U.S. administration adopt that would preserve its friendly relations with
Georgia, while seeking to resolve the ongoing tensions in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia?
Personifying Georgia
The U.S. relationship with Georgia, particularly in the years since the Rose
Revolution that brought Mikheil Saakashvili’s government to power in 2004, is
a critical contextual piece to understand the current conflict between Georgia
and Russia. Washington’s strong support for Saakashvili’s regime influenced the
U.S. position toward the frozen conflicts, and subsequently the U.S. response in
August 2008.
L’etat c’est Misha: Saakashvili’s Personal Ties
Saakashvili’s government emerged in 2004 out of the ashes of the failed, corrupt
regime of his predecessor Eduard Shevardnadze. Under the now dubbed ‘‘Rose
Revolution,’’ the young and charismatic Georgian president came to power in
late 2003 and early 2004 after Shevardnadze’s party, the Citizen’s Union of
Georgia (CUG), tried to steal one too many elections. The CUG’s attempts to
force fraudulent election results on the Georgian people led to weeks of peaceful
demonstrations in Tbilisi, culminating in Shevardnadze’s resignation and the
election a few weeks later of Saakashvili, who had been the preeminent leader of
these protests. Saakashvili and his first prime minister, Zurab Zhvania, even
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people in Washington, as the future of a
democratic Georgia. The timing of the Rose
Revolution was fortunate for the young English-
speaking leaders because their dramatic rise to
power and bold commitments to join the West
fit in precisely with President George W. Bush’s
publicly stated goal of promoting democracy
around the world. At a time of growing inter-
national concerns about the U.S.-led invasion
and the state of the reconstruction effort in Iraq,
post-revolution Georgia offered a rare and
successful model of sudden democratic transformation.
Almost immediately, post-Rose Revolution Georgia began to take on greater
significance for the Bush administration than it probably should have. The
United States held up Georgia to the world as an example of the fruits of
Western democracy promotion efforts and proof that democracy could still
spread to hitherto unimagined parts of the world. The Rose Revolution was
presented as having made Georgia democratic in a matter of weeks, rather than a
high-profile incident in Georgia’s complex political development, which would
have been more accurate.
The increasing significance of the U.S./Georgia relationship was reflected in
U.S. policy, which quickly moved away from supporting the development of
democratic institutions and Georgian civil society to directly supporting the
Georgian government. Aid and projects for building diverse political parties,
ensuring media freedoms, and nurturing civil society were curtailed while
supporting the government’s state-building project became a U.S. priority.1
These developments marked the beginning of the process that essentially
transformed the nature of the bilateral relationship from between two states to
between two regimes.
The regime-to-regime relationship also took on a personalized aspect as
Saakashvili and Bush built a friendship based around mutual support for their
governments, belief in the global spread of democracy and freedom, and a shared
policy vision on issues ranging from promoting free market economies to
supporting the military effort in Iraq and fighting the global war on terror.
Although Georgia was clearly not able to provide financial, or even meaningful
political, support to the United States in Iraq, the Bush administration
appreciated Georgia’s willingness to continue to send troops after many other
countries had left. While the Bush administration was losing international
legitimacy and respect, Saakashvili publicly proclaimed that Georgia and the
United States shared ‘‘common values.’’2 Few countries in the world would have
welcomed Bush as warmly as he was in 2005 by Saakashvili and the Georgian
Most Georgians
viewed South Ossetia
and Abkhazia as lost
as the 21st century
began.
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people. The trip, which featured a long Georgian
feast complete with Georgian folk dancing, a
speech by Bush to a large and enthusiastic crowd
in Tbilisi, and the decision by the Georgian
government to rename the main highway from
the airport into the center of Tbilisi after Bush,
left a personal mark on the relationship between
the two regimes.
As the Rose Revolution receded, the early
democratic promises of Saakashvili’s government
seemed increasingly elusive. At the same time, the Bush administration’s second
term was characterized by failed policies abroad and home. Abroad, the
deteriorating situation in Iraq was accompanied with setbacks for democracy
in places such as Uzbekistan where the Andijan massacre in 2005 set democracy
back substantially, the Palestinian Authority where U.S.-supported elections saw
Hamas rise to power, Pakistan where General Pervez Musharraf governed with
authoritarian-like powers, and Kenya where violent riots followed a flawed
presidential election. At home, the government’s disastrous handling of the
Hurricane Katrina response and a set of corruption scandals contributed to the
electoral defeat for the Republican Party in the midterm elections of 2006. The
Bush administration’s sinking popularity, both at home and abroad, led the two
regimes to develop a relationship of mutual dependency, albeit for different
purposes. As the Bush administration attempted to recover from the 2006
electoral defeat, it continued to remain close to Georgia, and promoted Georgia
as a great democratic success. Georgia’s dependency on the United States during
this period was apparent as the small state received a great deal of U.S. financial
and military support.
Equally importantly, Washington politically supported the Georgian govern-
ment even as it became increasingly clear that Georgia was no longer the
‘‘beacon of liberty’’ that Bush had called it in his 2005 speech in Tbilisi.3 The
Georgian government knew that while European countries might express
concern over reduced media freedom, and elections which grew less free and
fair as they grew more competitive, it could always depend on Washington for
unequivocal support.
In November 2007, the Tbilisi government declared a state of emergency and
staged a violent crackdown on peaceful demonstrations that had been calling for
greater democracy and early parliamentary elections in Georgia. But U.S.
officials refused to publicly criticize the Georgian government for its heavy
handed actions. Furthermore, Georgia’s push for NATO membership has
strongly been supported by the Bush administration despite negative develop-
ments. If there have been any U.S. government criticisms, they have been made
Georgia entered
or was baited into
a military conflict
that it could not
possibly win.
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privately. Publicly, Georgian officials visiting
Washington have been warmly greeted and
given broad access to administration officials
and Congress. Support for Georgia’s member-
ship in NATO has been unequivocal in the
United States even as western European allies
raise many questions about Georgia’s democratic
credentials and readiness for NATO. The sig-
nificance of the warmth from the United States
for the Georgian regime, as it became more
embattled at home by unmet expectations and
domestic critics, should not be understated, especially given the generally pro-
U.S. disposition of the Georgian people.
Frozen Thinking about Conflicts
The tenor of the relationship between Georgia and the United States also
framed the U.S. approach toward the frozen conflicts during the post-Rose
Revolution period. Abkhazia and South Ossetia had, with Russian support,
broken away from Georgia in the early 1990s, while a group of Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS)-authorized Russian peacekeepers had kept the two
sides apart since. Officials in both breakaway regions had established de facto
governments that relied heavily on security and economic ties with Russia.
Previously these regions had been populated by a diverse mix of Georgians and
local people, as well as other ethnic groups. After they broke away from Georgia,
about 210,000 ethnic Georgians were forced out of South Ossetia and
particularly Abkhazia, creating an Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) crisis
that is still a major issue in Georgia.
After the Saakashvili government came to power, the United States no
longer sought to present itself as anything approaching an honest broker,
sensitive to the needs and concerns of the Georgians as well as the people and
leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Instead of taking an approach to these
conflicts oriented on problem solving and reaching compromise solutions, the
United States consistently framed the discussion in terms of restoring Georgia’s
territorial integrity. For example, speaking at a press conference in Tbilisi in the
wake of the November 2007 crisis, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary Matt Bryza
emphasized that, ‘‘All of us now have a commitment to Georgia’s territorial
integrity. The United States, our colleagues in the Friends’ Group*/Germany,
the United Kingdom, Russia*/we’re all committed to Georgia’s territorial
integrity. So, no step should be taken now that in any way questions Georgia’s
territorial integrity. Georgia has a responsibility to work with the international
community and, most importantly, with the Abkhaz, the South Ossetians, to
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resolve those conflicts peacefully. That’s happen-
ing. Nobody should question our support for
Georgia’s territorial integrity.’’4 The U.S. stance
indicated that U.S. officials saw the conflict only
through Tbilisi’s eyes, and immediately lost the
confidence of Russian leaders as well as the
territories themselves, ensuring that no real
solutions would ever be reached. Constant rheto-
rical emphasis on these issues, however, and the
perception that the U.S. supported Georgia’s
position was very helpful to the Saakashvili
regime politically.
The U.S. approach to the frozen conflicts has been indirectly, but not
unsubstantially, driven by Saakashvili’s domestic political needs, rather than by
an attempt to bring enduring peace to the region. The notion of Georgia’s
territorial integrity, while a hope of many Georgians, seemed to ignore the
reality that most Georgians themselves viewed South Ossetia, and to a greater
extent, Abkhazia, as lost as the twenty-first century began. These regions had
not been governed by Tbilisi for 15 years. And Russia had made it clear that they
were not going to allow these regions to be absorbed by Georgia, even under a
federal formula. Georgians dreamed of the return of the territories, but did not
view this as a likely outcome and did not demand their return from the
government authorities. The government of Georgia, however, consistently
focused on the need to win back the territories. Increasingly, this distracted the
attention of both the Georgian government and the people from the more urgent
and realistic tasks of governing and rebuilding the country. The government
could, and did, often explain away its failures to meet more pressing goals by
changing the subject to the need to restore the lost territories. Throughout this
classic attempt to use nationalism to deflect attention from its domestic failings,
U.S. policy supported and reinforced Tbilisi’s political strategy.
U.S. policy also precluded real solutions to the frozen conflicts that might
have helped Georgia in the longer term. Ideas such as developing international
administration of the regions under UN trusteeship, for example, were never
seriously discussed by the United States. Instead, various proposals for a federal
relationship between the regions and the central Georgian government were
proposed, and unrestricted return of IDPs continued to remain a prerequisite of
all proposed solutions. The largely irrelevant example of Ajara*/a province
populated by ethnic Georgians that had been ruled by an autonomous warlord
but had been brought under central control after the Rose Revolution*/was
often cited as a model by Georgian officials when referring to the frozen
territories. Unwavering U.S. support for these politically almost unimaginable
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solutions made it easy for Georgia to maintain its hard-line, all-or-nothing
position.
Washington’s failure to acknowledge, and clarify, a potential affirmative
precedent with the recognition of Kosovo’s independence in February
2008*/Washington insisted that Kosovo was a sui generis or unique case
without any relevance for other disputed territories*/further allowed Moscow to
cynically and selectively draw links between Kosovo and Georgia’s breakaway
territories. U.S. and European officials could have emphasized that Kosovo’s
final status talks were only begun after years of international administration
under a UN mandate and a prolonged process of institutional reforms that were
supervised (and continue to be observed) by the international community. No
remotely comparable experience characterized the breakaway territories of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Yet, after the West’s recognition of Kosovo’s
unilateral declaration of independence, officials in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
were empowered to dig in their heels for independence as their only preferred
final status with what they now perceived as international justification.
Saakashvili’s Aspirations and Blank Checks
The increasingly personalized relationship between Georgian and the U.S.
administrations played a significant role in the months leading up to the
outbreak of war between Georgia and Russia. Even the events of November
2007*/which saw the Georgian government close critical private media outlets
and use force to break up peaceful demonstrations in Tbilisi, resulting in over
500 demonstrators being hospitalized*/did not affect the U.S. views and position
regarding the status of democracy in Georgia. The ensuing January 2008
presidential elections, which fell short of international democratic standards as
Saakashvili avoided a second round run-off, also drew no criticism from
Washington. The election occurred only days after a state of emergency was
lifted, during a time when the major independent television station had been
shut down. Saakashvili just exceeded the 50 percent mark in the first round, but
there was ample manipulation of the balloting which likely pushed Saakashvili
above this threshold. Dieter Boden, the head of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (OSCE/ODHIR) election observation mission referred to ‘‘crass,
negligent and deliberate falsification during the vote counting.’’5
Even more remarkably, U.S. officials remained silent about the seriously
flawed May 2008 parliamentary elections, which further consolidated Saakash-
vili’s United National Movement’s (UNM) grip on power as the UNM won just
over 59 percent of the votes and 119 of 150 parliamentary seats. The final
OSCE/ODHIR report on the election found ‘‘credible reports’’ of intimidation
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of opposition candidates, irregularities and a lack of transparency in the
tabulation process, the improper use of state administrative resources by the
UNM, and a lack of balance in media coverage.6 In Europe, however, these
events continued to change perceptions of the state of democracy in Georgia and
to create more sober assessments of its future prospects. For example, on
November 29, 2007 the European parliament issued a statement that expressed
its ‘‘deep concern at recent developments that have taken place in Georgia, with
the violent police crackdown on peaceful demonstrations, the closing down of
independent media outlets and the declaration of a state of emergency for 15
days as the latest escalations’’ and reminded the Georgian government that its
actions ‘‘run counter to Euro-Atlantic values’’ and that ‘‘democracy, human
rights and the rule of law are prerequisites for Euro-Atlantic integration.’’7
Beyond the question of challenging Russia, unfavorable political changes in
Georgia were also a major concern behind the lack of western European support
for Georgia’s bid to NATO in early 2008. Differences in outlooks also
contributed to the varying U.S. and European responses to the August 2008
conflict.
Saakashvili’s Nationalism
A strong relationship with the United States and an embattled administration
led by Saakashvili created a strong domestic imperative for military action in
Abkhazia or South Ossetia in the summer of 2008. The Georgian government
was coming off a six-month period which had seen a government crackdown on
street demonstrations, followed by a state of emergency and two elections, held
in January and May of 2008. The elections themselves strengthened Saakashvili
and UNM’s formal grip on power, though the elections were assessed as being
less than democratic by international monitors and even more critically by
domestic observers. Even though economic development in Georgia was good
overall, the benefits had not yet trickled down to ordinary Georgians, and still
came far short of the unrealistic expectations set by the Georgian government.
The political support of the administration, therefore, continued to weaken even
as its formal power grew.
Tbilisi’s strategy for remaining strong in the face of these unmet expectations
and political turmoil was to raise expectations again*/this time over the future of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In fairness, eventually restoring Georgian
territorial integrity had always been important for most Georgians, but the
UNM increased their rhetoric on these issues, particularly during both 2008
election campaigns where they spoke about the IDPs being home by the New
Year. The rhetoric not only raised expectations among voters, but it backed the
government into a corner as the promise to restore Abkhazia and South Ossetia
became the primary way for the Saakashvili government to maintain support
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among the Georgian people. Unfortunately for Georgia, this was never going to
be an easy task, even as it became an issue of political survival for Saakashvili.
UNM’s provocative rhetoric may have won another election for Saakashvili, but
it put domestic and international political forces*/notably Russia’s military
buildup and creeping annexation of the breakaway territories*/onto an
irreversible and dangerous course toward each other.
Moscow’s troop build-up and formal establishment of relations with the de
facto governments in April and May spurred the Georgian government to further
contemplate its military options. Much commentary has been spent over the
exact sequence of events in early August and determining which country
provoked the other and at what exact hour. Certainly, both the Russian and
Georgian sides had drawn up comprehensive war plans in the event of a
Georgian assault on South Ossetia, which is exactly what materialized after a
week of artillery shelling by sides at the beginning of August. Yet, from our
perspective, debating whether Tbilisi was justified in responding to the Russian-
backed South Ossetian militia provocations misses the broader political context
that Georgia entered or was baited into a military conflict that it could not
possibly win and did so against the expressed wishes and prior cautions issued by
U.S. officials.
Washington’s Mixed Signals
Although it is almost certain that the United States did not give the green light
to Saakashvili and his ill-chosen military activity on August 7, 2008, and equally
likely that the United States warned the Georgian president not to pursue such a
course of action, this only tells part of the story. There are numerous unofficial
channels through which Washington and Tbilisi communicate. The various
current and former government officials, lobbyists, and U.S./Georgia supporters,
many of whom can be seen in Tbilisi on any given day, may have sent a very
different message to the Georgian government. The real possibility that this
created a background of encouragement, which Georgian leaders heard over
official discouragement, should not be overlooked. Having decided to take the
extreme step of trying to change the status quo by force, to counter Russia’s
continuing creeping annexation of the breakaway territories, shows that Tbilisi
hardliners must have heard encouraging signals from U.S. sources, whether they
came from official channels or not.
Beyond unofficial signals, the nature of the official relationship between the
two countries since the 2003 Rose Revolution made it difficult for Washington
to restrain its close ally. After more than four years of never publicly criticizing
Georgia, even after the crackdown of November 2007, it was unlikely that
private official U.S. warnings would dissuade the Georgian government from an
action that was viewed as essential to its regime’s survival. While these warnings
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may have been crystal clear, it was probably
equally clear to the Georgian leadership that
there would be no consequences for ignoring
them, as there had been no consequences for
ignoring private U.S. warnings before.
Throughout this period, U.S. policy toward
Georgia was confined by its inability to clearly
see the deteriorating state of Georgian democ-
racy and domestic politics, which was moving
the country toward a devastating military
confrontation with an aggressive and hostile Russia in a futile attempt to
restore Georgian territorial integrity. The tilted U.S. view made it difficult for
Washington to act in a manner consistent with its own regional interests. As it
continued to see the frozen conflicts through Georgian eyes, the United States
never fully understood the extent to which Abkhazia and South Ossetia were
unlikely to be brought back into Georgia on Tbilisi’s terms. By summer 2008,
U.S. policy in the region reflected Georgian interests, not those of the United
States.
After the Crisis: Principles for a More Sustainable U.S./Georgian
Relationship
In the aftermath of the Russian/Georgian conflict, U.S. policy toward Georgia
must change course. Rather than emphasize personal relationships between the
two regimes, the U.S./Georgian ties need to be institutionalized across a more
diversified set of contacts, processes, and actors. Similarly, the United States
needs to think about a greater range of creative sovereign solutions to resolve the
breakaway conflicts. Absent changes on both dimensions, U.S. officials risk
escalating tensions toward another round of devastating conflict.
Depersonalizing the Relationship
The United States should once again emphasize supporting Georgia’s democracy
as a foreign policy principle in its bilateral relations. Funding to help develop a
meaningful multi-party system should be reinstated, while new programs to
ensure and monitor the independence of judicial institutions and the media
should be expanded and coordinated with other international partners such as
the EU and the OSCE. Having emphasized state-building projects such as
reforming the bureaucracy, rebuilding infrastructure, and providing technical
support to several Georgian ministries for the last four years, U.S. priorities
should once again promote democratic development as well.
Support for democracy is not only critical to re-balance the U.S./Georgia






THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY/ j JANUARY 200936



























faltering Euro-Atlantic ambitions. Even prior
to the conflict, Georgia’s group of ‘‘New
Friends’’*/European countries that sympathize
with Tbilisi’s aspirations for Western integra-
tion*/emphasized that improving the quality
of democracy was a prerequisite for advancing
its Euro-Atlantic objectives. Having Washing-
ton maintain a tougher stance on democracy
would not only get Georgia back on a long-
term path toward Euro-Atlantic integration, but would also signal to the EU
that the United States is serious about encouraging long-term institutional
reforms in Georgia, and not merely supporting a client state or a U.S.-friendly
regime in Eurasia.
Yet, in the aftermath of the conflict, troubling signs have emerged in Tbilisi
that it will seek to further centralize power and squelch political opposition, as it
conflates loyalty to the Saakashvili regime with loyalty to the Georgian state.
Georgian leaders have warned that Moscow’s determination to enact regime
change in Tbilisi must be met with a firm domestic response. On August 29,
2008, Saakashvili announced that he would seek parliamentary approval of a
U.S.-style ‘‘Patriot Act,’’ designed to guard against internal Russian destabiliza-
tion of his government. Though details of the act are still unclear, democracy
advocates rightly fear that such legislation will infringe upon civil liberties and
could lead to a national witch hunt of alleged traitors or Russian sympathizers.
U.S. officials and the international community must not allow the Georgian
regime to violate Georgia’s laws or due process in the name of defending
national security.
Within this context, U.S. officials must also carefully monitor, specify the
precise use, and even condition the disbursal of the astonishing $1 billion
promised to assist Georgia in its post-conflict reconstruction (about $570 million
in fiscal year 2008 with the balance to be appropriated by the next Congress).
Having damaged its own credibility by failing to rein in Georgian hardliners
prior to the conflict, Washington, less than four weeks after the war started, has
seemingly rewarded Georgian officials for their reckless conduct, which caused
damage not just to Georgia, but to U.S. regional interests and goals as well. The
lack of a clear plan to sequence the disbursals or attach conditions for the aid
would be truly remarkable for what will now be the third largest recipient of U.S.
assistance in the world (after Israel and Egypt).
At the very least, U.S. officials should lay out clear expectations for the
purpose and use of the funds by stating that the aid package is intended for
humanitarian and reconstruction purposes, not for support of the Georgian
government. Washington should encourage Georgia’s private media and civil
Troubling signs have
emerged that Tbilisi
will seek to further
centralize power.
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society to monitor the disbursal of these funds and coordinate oversight with
other international donors. Absent adequate oversight, the infusion of this aid
into this small economy over just two years is likely to encourage the Georgian
regime to waste or misappropriate funds to further its own political survival, as
happened in other recent recipients of U.S. reconstruction funds such as Bosnia,
Kosovo, and the Palestinian Authority. Especially tricky is how Washington will
handle the question of how and at what level to re-arm the Georgian military.
The immediate and full replenishing of the Georgian armed forces would
constitute a classic case of ‘‘moral hazard,’’ or rewarding, rather than punishing,
misuse.
A third policy that could further institutionalize Georgia’s contacts with the
United States and the West is to grant it a revised NATO Membership Action
Plan (MAP), but without a commitment that future membership will necessarily
or even likely follow. A Georgian MAP, however, should not be offered
immediately, but should be subject to a successful and transparent reconstruction
process and Tbilisi’s continued democratic progress over the next couple of
years. Such a declaration would exactly reverse the curious and counter-
productive declaration made at the April 2008 Bucharest NATO summit, when
NATO officials rejected a MAP but stated that Georgia would inevitably join
the security organization in the future.8 A Georgia with a MAP would be
required to take greater steps to improve its democratic governance and
oversight of the military. It would also have to increase the transparency of its
chains of command, while it integrates certain operational and planning
procedures with those of other allies. Further, Georgia’s MAP should be
separated from that of Ukraine, thereby allowing the possibility that one of
the candidate countries could enter the security organization on its own merits if
the other failed to make sufficient progress. As Georgian officials themselves
have acknowledged, granting an open-ended MAP will not commit the United
States or its NATO allies to the Article V obligations of militarily supporting
Georgia in the event of another conflict. Such obligations only apply to full
members, not applicants. If Georgian officials chose to deviate from the norms
and expectations that come with a MAP, then NATO officials should make it
clear that they would not be offered membership.
Managing the Conflicts
In addition to supporting broader democratic development in Georgia, the
United States should abandon its non-compromising commitment to maintain
Georgia’s territorial integrity. The commitment to this principle enabled Tbilisi
to plan for a military operation to reclaim the breakaway regions and rendered
the numerous compromise formulas for solving territorial disputes, developed
under the supervision and engagement of the United States itself, useless.
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Practically, if Tbilisi’s proposals for ‘‘limitless
autonomy’’ under a federal architecture were
unacceptable before the events of August, they
are simply off the table now for the immediate
future for the de facto governments of these
regions. Maintaining a call to ‘‘solve’’ the frozen
conflicts by simply re-uniting Georgia will not
only continue to drive Abkhazian and Ossetian
officials to Moscow’s arms, but will delay the
Georgian public from having to come to terms
with the inevitable sovereign compromises that
nearly always have characterized the negotiated resolution of modern territorial
disputes in places such as the Balkans or Northern Ireland.
Reversing position on this issue should in no way be taken as support for
Moscow’s reckless recognition of the independence of the breakaway territories.
Rather, the United States and its European partners should steadfastly refuse to
recognize the self-declared independence of the breakaway territories, while at
the same time support the adoption of an international process that will attempt
to resolve status issues without a preconceived endpoint. Showing greater
flexibility regarding Georgia’s territorial integrity can allow U.S. officials to take
a number of constructive steps toward facilitating such a process.
First, U.S. officials could de-link the status of Abkhazia from that of South
Ossetia. Though both were previously referred to as ‘‘frozen conflicts,’’ the two
regions’ differing characteristics, size, locations, and administrative capacities
will likely necessitate different sovereign formulas for their eventual resolution.
South Ossetia’s enclave status, small population, and complete dependence on
Russia through the Roki tunnel, which cuts through the towering Caucasus
mountains and allows Russia to bring supplies to South Ossetia, renders it an
unviable sovereign polity. South Ossetia’s absorption and annexation into the
Russian Federation and/or Northern Ossetia appear all but inevitable.
Accordingly, U.S. officials should encourage Georgian negotiators to obtain a
series of firm security guarantees from Moscow, which could include the
deployment of a more robust and international peacekeeping force on the
Georgian/Ossetian border. Georgian and Western negotiators should demand
that the most recent wave of IDPs*/who were ethnically cleansed and driven
from their villages by Russian soldiers during this conflict*/be allowed to return
to their villages and have their security guaranteed by an international
peacekeeping mission, even within new administrative boundaries. No doubt,
such concessions will be politically painful for Georgia, but Tbilisi will then at
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Abkhazia is a more complicated case, both because it is larger than South
Ossetia and because its Black Sea coastline affords it potentially more options for
forging regional and international ties*/though it is still not ready for sovereign
statehood. At a minimum, U.S. officials should now follow a strategy to increase
Abkhazia’s international ties and autonomy in order to reduce its dependency on
Russia, and encourage Tbilisi to pursue the same strategy. Encouraging the
adoption of an international process or even UN trusteeship status to deal with
status issues could finally drive some daylight between Russia and Abkhazia.
Based on the precedent of the UN missions in East Timor and Kosovo,
Abkhazia, in exchange for placing itself under international trusteeship, would
gain access to Western economic assistance and loans, forge robust new trade ties
with neighbors such as Turkey, and wean itself off of its economic dependency
on Russia. The port of Ochamchire could be opened as a regional commerce
hub, under international supervision, while the Sukhumi airport could once
again be re-opened for international flights. Abkhazia’s international access,
however, would have to be conditioned upon its continued participation in an
internationally-administered status process. Abkhaz officials would be faced with
a basic choice: join the international community under international supervision
or remain completely isolated and dependent on Russia. Though skeptics may
point out that Moscow would be reluctant to cede authority of these regions to a
third party, Tbilisi and Washington could, at the very least, use calls for
internationalization, with all of its potential benefits for Abkhazia, as a strategy
to pry the Abkhazian leadership away from Moscow and ensure more vigorous
European engagement.
Normalizing U.S./Georgian Relations
Over the last four years, U.S./Georgia relations have been characterized by
strong personal ties between the regimes and an unflinching U.S. commitment
to maintaining Georgia’s territorial integrity. Yet, these ties prevented U.S.
officials from credibly restraining Georgia in the face of Russian provocations.
They also have heightened international perceptions that the Saakashvili
regime, despite its public commitment to democracy, remains a client of
Washington that will continue to receive unconditional support from its
superpower patron.
To place the U.S./Georgia relationship on more stable footing and bring
greater credibility to U.S. regional policy, the United States should no longer
conflate support of Georgian democracy with unconditional support of the
Saakashvili government. Georgia’s democratic institutions*/its political parties,
civil society groups, legal branches, and independent media*/all require U.S.
support, especially now in the wake of a conflict that has encouraged Georgian
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authorities to further centralize and consolidate domestic power. U.S. officials
should join European partners in adopting a more flexible and creative approach
to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. If the international community
is unable to establish a mechanism and timetable for their resolution, these
unresolved disputes will continue to fester and encourage aggressive nationalism.
Georgia’s unequivocal backers and hardliners will likely respond that such a
prescription ignores Moscow’s damaging conduct, its unacceptable breach of
international law, and occupation of Georgian territory. Yet, none of the
proposed recommendations diminishes Russia’s culpability for its actions in
Georgia, nor releases Moscow from its commitments to abide by the elements of
the negotiated peace process to which it has agreed. Nor does rebalancing the
U.S./Georgia relationship as outlined above imply that the United States, along
with the transatlantic community, should show any less of a commitment to
supporting the embattled Eurasian country and a war-wary Georgian public.
Quite the opposite: only by depersonalizing U.S./Georgian relations can a
broader and more sustainable basis be built from which to effectively facilitate
Georgia’s democratic development and international integration.
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